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Abstract: This article examines the legal and normative foundations of media content regulation in
the borderless networked society. We explore the extent to which internet undertakings should be
subject to state regulation, in light of Canada’s ongoing debates and legislative reform. We bring a
cross-disciplinary perspective (from the subject fields of law; communications studies, in particular
McLuhan’s now classic probes; international relations; and technology studies) to enable both policy
and language analysis. We apply the concept of sovereignty to states (national cultural and digital
sovereignty), media platforms (transnational sovereignty), and citizens (autonomy and personal
data sovereignty) to examine the competing dynamics and interests that need to be considered and
mediated. While there is growing awareness of the tensions between state and transnational media
platform powers, the relationship between media content regulation and the collection of viewers’
personal data is relatively less explored. We analyse how future media content regulation needs
to fully account for personal data extraction practices by transnational platforms and other media
content undertakings. We posit national cultural sovereignty—a constant unfinished process and
framework connecting the local to the global—as the enduring force and justification of media content
regulation in Canada. The exercise of state sovereignty may be applied not so much to secure strict
territorial borders and centralized power over citizens but to act as a mediating power to promote
and protect citizens’ individual and collective interests, locally and globally.
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1. Introduction
Canada, like other countries, faces regulatory challenges posed by an increasingly
networked environment in which everything is connected and in which power increasingly
resides in global corporate agencies and online platforms. Legislative reform is underway in response to such globalized platforms and how they affect communications and
broadcasting within our borders. A recent government-commissioned report speaks of
upholding core values associated with national sovereignty and citizen rights: supporting
our democratic values that allow for both inclusivity and diversity, realizing the promise of
advanced technologies to benefit Canada’s economy, and building a culture that embraces
a connected life for all citizens, in a trusted and equitable environment.1
Yet, the question of revising and implementing an effective regulatory framework in
the new environment remains open. Issues of state sovereignty are now intertwined with
issues of personal data and subject sovereignty, whereby the consumer and communicative
choices of citizens—“behavioral surplus” associated with content viewing and social media
habits—are constantly tracked. Various corporate apps and options fight for the attention of
users, and seek to influence and dictate their choices through a highly diversified range of
content offerings dominated by global platform operators. Citizens used to this free-market
range and often oblivious to the traps of surveillance and data capture are poised to resent
government interventions, and certainly platform operators protest against any regulatory
moves on the part of governments as protectionist impositions.
Another challenge to revising communications law and policy is that borders between
different legal regimes that have traditionally operated in relatively distinct spheres (i.e.,
telecommunications, broadcasting, competition, privacy, consumer protection) are quickly
dissolving. These regimes are being called to the task of addressing the multi-layered
and interrelated challenges of the networked society. Yet, in a climate of technological
acceleration, new policies meant to respond to current conditions and challenges might no
sooner be passed than outmoded.
This article investigates the normative and legal foundations upon which states,
transnational media platforms, and citizens can or should assert their power or autonomy,
or require protection, with respect to media content. We resort to the concept of sovereignty
as an organizing principle, to help identify the source of legitimacy of various actors’
powers and interests and their competing dynamics, locally and globally.
From a Canadian perspective, what powers and levers does the state have in the
borderless networked society? What role should it (not) play to ensure its citizens access
1

(Government of Canada 2020a), at 10 (Report issued pursuant to a Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review undertaken in 2018)
[Communications Future Report].
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to quality, diverse, representative news, cultural, and other content, that reflects and
connects them locally and globally? Rather than providing a detailed prescription, our
goal is to propose a framework of reference to navigate and mediate between competing
sovereignties.
We ask how media and communications studies—in particular McLuhan’s now classic
probes, that raise questions about the locus and ends of media influence and control—may
help in reframing the regulatory challenges of media content regulation in Canada. In
particular, we are interested in his insights about the space in which state regulation is
justified and should be (re)claimed, and his speculations about how policy should be less
an agency of governance than a tool to promote citizens’ interests. Despite his cautioninducing predictions about the dissolution of boundaried space, nation-based governance
and localized legal authority, he reckons the need for oversight. Can codes and policy be
generated to mobilize regulatory practices in the spirit of responding to regional needs, and
in the letter of expressing humanist interests in a way that is flexible and adaptive? How
can McLuhan and other communication theories provide insights about the interrelation
between state, transnational digital platforms, and personal (data) sovereignty? About
privacy, public and private spheres of interest?
By media content, we refer to curated or commissioned audio, audiovisual content
that is intended to inform, enlighten or entertain, and that is made available to the public
by means of telecommunication. This essentially refers to programs under traditional
broadcasting legislation made available through technologically neutral means.2 While
some of the analysis provided in this article may find application to alphanumeric news and
user-generated content, they are not the primary focus here and as such are not included in
our reference to media content.3 Unless specifically stated otherwise, we refer to regulation
as state regulation, understanding that there exist other forms of non-state, private sector,
international regulation, as well as non-written forms of rules and procedures such as
software code and protocols that effectively act as regulation.4
We bring a cross-disciplinary perspective (from the subject fields of law, communications, international relations, and technology studies) to enable both policy and language
analysis. Our methodological approach is mixed. We rely on rhetorical and discursive
analysis, as well as legal doctrinal analysis, to examine current laws, policy and academic
debates. We focus on regulatory questions in a Canadian context, understanding that there
are similar struggles taking place in other nations as well as mounting pressures for unified
transnational action to counter platform hegemony.
While there is growing awareness of the tensions between state and transnational media platform powers, the relationship between media content regulation and the collection
of viewers’ personal data is relatively less explored. One main thesis of this article is that
any future media content regulation needs to fully account for the impact of personal data
collection practices by digital media content platforms. We contend that national cultural
sovereignty is an enduring justification of media content regulation in Canada, the exercise
of state power being subject to technological neutrality, territorial application of laws, and
human rights. Succumbing to the rhetoric of the free internet, and to the inevitability of
transnational digital platforms’ political, economic, and network forces, may harm more
than serve citizens’ and states’ interests. We posit national cultural sovereignty, connecting
the local to the global, as a constant unfinished process and framework, to nurture and
protect democratic institutions and cultural expression in a way that reflects Canadian
identity, shared values in their uniqueness and plurality, and that respects individual rights
2

3
4

See Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, s. 2(1) “program”. See also Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 122 (recommending modifications
to the Broadcasting Act definition of program to make it more technologically neutral and to include alphanumeric news (while subjecting the latter
to different regulatory regime)).
See below Section 4.3 “Personal (Data) Sovereignty”, briefly situating user-generated content within media content regulation debates.
(Hamilton and Robinson 2019) at 16 (defining regulation as “established rules and procedures applied by governments and other political and
administrative authorities to all kinds of expressive activities” citing Denis McQuail, Media Regulation (University of Leicester, Department of
Media and Communication, Leicester, UK, 2010) at para. 1. online: https://www2.le.ac.uk/projects/oer/oers/media-and-communication/oers/
ms7501/mod2unit11/mod2unit11cg.pdf (accessed on 3 June 2021).
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and freedoms. Moreover, traditional notions of statehood and territory need to adjust to
the reality of new connectivities and interdependence.
2. The Networked Society
Throughout this article, we situate the ongoing challenges of media content regulation
within the context of the networked society, arguing that successful regulation to localize the
space to occupy within it depends on understanding its main characteristics and effects.
There is no shortage of attributes to describe the networked society: invisible, ubiquitous,
“always on”, ecosystem connecting the physical brick and mortar world to virtual networks
of data, unprecedented extraction and processing of (personal) data through powerful
algorithms, borderlessness, the prevalence of private ordering and non-negotiated standard
terms and conditions imposed by firms on consumers. This space has enabled the rise of
powerful transnational digital (media) platforms,5 where from an individual perspective,
the lines between private and public, the commercial and the citizenry are increasingly
blurred, porous, and exposed, empowering consumers with new opportunities, while at
the same time making them increasingly vulnerable.
Zuboff describes the networked society as follows: “The everywhere, always-on instrumentation, datafication, connection, communication, computation of all things, animate
and inanimate, and all processes, natural, human, physiological, chemical, machine, administrative, vehicular, financial. Real world activity is continuously rendered from phones,
cars, streets, homes, shops, bodies, trees, buildings, airports, and cities back to the digital
realm, where it finds new life as data ready for transformation into predictions [ . . . ]”.6
Zuboff’s description of the networked society closely replicates McLuhan’s presentation
of the world as a global village. In these connected environments, it is as if space has
imploded, with our “world contracted to village size”.7 We no longer live as private individuals, but have access to others and information at an “everything-all-at- once” speed.
In our “here comes everybody” parade, we no longer discriminate between experts and
others because everyone is connected and a positive or liberatory outcome is our feeling
empowered by having access to information and information sharing.8 Responding to
the principle of instant connectivity, our social habits, along with organizational patterns,
change to form “the new world of the global village”—one without former firm borders in
place and without reassuring centre-margins structure; we are “suddenly experiencing an
instantaneous reassembling of all . . . mechanized bits into an organized whole”.9 Such
accelerating technological developments transform the Earth into a human-made environment, and while there are advantages to such innovations—perhaps most evident in areas
like knowledge sharing, leisure and health—the cost is that humans must protect vitality
and creativity by controlling what they unleashed.
3. Canadian Media Content Regulation Space
The regulatory space that Canada occupies with respect to media content is as revealing as the sovereignty it has refrained from exercising in recent decades. This section
surveys how media content is regulated in Canada, its origins, and how the internet space
has been largely left unregulated, increasingly leading to a two-tier system. It also presents
the current silos of regulation and queries the extent to which they are still justified in the
present media space.
Historically, the underlying premises and objectives of Canadian media content regulation have been to preserve and promote national cultural sovereignty, such as through the
protection of Canadian content against US powerful industries, and to distinguish Canada

5
6
7
8
9

See discussion below in Section 4.2 “Transnational Digital Platform Sovereignty”.
(Zuboff 2019, p. 202).
(McLuhan [1964] 2003, p. 395), [Understanding Media].
(McLuhan and Fiore 1968, p. 23).
Understanding Media, supra note 7 at 130.
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from Europe.10 The new Broadcasting Act and the creation of the Canadian Radio-Television
Commission (CRTC) in 1968 conferred extensive regulatory powers, with the last major
revisions to the Act having taken place in 1991. Media content regulation in Canada has often been referred to as the “grand bargain” between the broadcasting industry and federal
government. In exchange for protecting the Canadian broadcasting system from foreign
competition through a requirement of Canadian ownership and control, the Broadcasting
Act sets out minimum Canadian content requirements and standards, and funding obligations for the creation of Canadian content. These have been an integral part of Canadian
cultural policy serving the needs, aspirations, and interests of Canadians.11 The public
broadcaster CBC/SRC has been a pillar in implementing Canada’s media content policy.12
The main laws governing communications in Canada are the Broadcasting Act,13
Telecommunications Act,14 and Radiocommunication Act.15 The CRTC16 and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) are conferred various powers including
the implementation of policy objectives set under those acts.17 The Broadcasting Act regulates audio and audiovisual content transmitted in Canada, the Telecommunications Act
governs all other communications including activities related to the operation of physical
communications networks, while the Radiocommunication Act governs the allocation of radio or spectrum licences, and other communication-related technical aspects.18 In addition,
the personal data protection regime (Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA) and other applicable laws)19 is increasingly relevant to the regulation of
media content, given the intensification of collection of personal data as viewers engage
with media content online.
The legal silos created by the laws governing communications in Canada are increasingly porous and intertwined. Media convergence coupled with the intensification
of personal data collection are leading to a legal regimes’ convergence.20 Internet broadcasters (e.g., Netflix), as well as traditional public and private broadcasters (CBC/SRC,
e.g., CTV), increasingly transmit their media content through services regulated by the
Telecommunications Act. The consumption of media content via online platforms, or through
traditional over-the-air broadcasting with online connections, enables the tracking and
collection of a broad range of viewers’ personal data. While recent communications policy reports and commentators acknowledge these legal regimes’ convergence,21 ongoing
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

(Charland 1986, p. 206; Golick and Speer 2019), at 7 (“A combination of the rise of Canadian nationalism in and around the centenary in 1967,
attendant concerns about the dominance of American culture and popular opposition to the Vietnam War, and the cultural and political influences
of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec contributed to a growing emphasis on “cultural sovereignty” and the “development of Canadian expression”
[ . . . ] These sentiments shaped [ . . . ] Canadian content (CanCon) requirements in conjunction with the establishment of the CRTC”); (Grant 2018),
(summarizing the four key features of Canadian Broadcasting System, i.e., (i) Canadian ownership and control (ii) that the system should safeguard,
enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada; (iii) creation and presentation of Canadian programming (iv) the
importance of the role of CBC).
Golick and Speer, supra note 10 at 7.
Grant, supra note 10.
Supra note 2.
S.C. 1993, c. 38.
R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2.
Established under the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-22.
The CRTC has various powers under the Telecommunications Act, supra note 14 and Broadcasting Act, supra note 2; the Radiocommunication Act, supra
note 15, confers powers to the Minister of Industry.
For a detailed analysis of the communication regulatory framework of broadcasting and telecommunications in Canada, see
(Bannerman 2020, pp. 159–214); see also Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 39–41.
S.C. 2000, c. 5, s. s. 2(1) “federal work, undertaking or business” (the Act applies to private sector radio broadcasting and telecommunications
companies); other privacy laws applying to the private sector include laws in provinces with general private-sector laws that have been deemed
substantially similar to PIPEDA, i.e., Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec: see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Summary of Privacy
Laws in Canada” (31 January 2018), online OPIC <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/02_05_d_15/> (accessed on 3 June
2021); Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21, s. 3 “government institution” (the Act applies to crown corporations including public broadcaster CBC/SRC);
Telecommunications Act, supra, note 14, s. 7 (i) (policy objectives include “the protection of the privacy of persons”).
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 164 (tracing back increased media convergence to the nineties).
See, e.g., Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 63–64 (while report generally acknowledges legal regimes convergence, one of recommendation is to keep telecommunications and broadcasting regulation distinct). See also (Flew 2016, p. 78) (on how traditional assumptions about
media regulation are increasingly challenged in a digitized online environment).
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Canadian legislative developments lean toward maintaining the distinction between the
regulation of broadcasting (programming, media content) and communications (conduit to
personal communications and media content), with some recognition of their connection
to issues of personal data protection. Communication networks and media content raise
distinct issues that have traditionally given rise to separate regulatory frameworks, liability
regimes and policy goals, such as net neutrality applying primarily to communication
network providers.22 At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the additional challenges
that the legal regimes’ convergence brings to the regulation of communications in Canada
and worldwide. Additionally, while the primary focus of this article is on media content
regulation traditionally associated with broadcasting regulation, our discussion on competing national, transnational platform, and personal (data) sovereignties exposes the limits of
our siloed communications regulation even further.
The CRTC regulates the transmission of programs23 through over-the-air, satellite, and
cable television and radio. Radio and television stations transmitting signals over the air or
by other means (e.g., CBC/Radio Canada, CTV), cable companies and satellite distributors
retransmitting programs received from another source (e.g., Rogers)24 and companies that
sell programs to, e.g., broadcasters (such as pay TV, specialty channels)25 require a licence
to operate (with some exceptions),26 and must comply with a variety of obligations and
content standards. They include, at varying degrees, the obligation to provide minimum
thresholds of Canadian content,27 to contribute to the creation of Canadian content,28 to
provide accessible content (such as through close captioning), to respect standards against
offensive materials, guidelines during elections,29 and to provide accurate news.30 The
Act mandates that the Canadian broadcasting system,31 a mix of national public broadcaster
(CBC—SRC), privately-owned entities, and community-based organizations, be effectively
owned and controlled by Canadians.32
The Broadcasting Act states an elaborate list of policy objectives, some mandatory (e.g.,
with respect to the prevalence of Canadian content, and about content reflecting the EnglishFrench linguistic duality), and some directional, to guide the CRTC in implementing the
Act to the Canadian broadcasting system, as a single system.33 Among those goals, the
Canadian broadcasting system needs to be adaptable to technological change,34 a concept
akin to the principle of technological neutrality guiding the construction and interpretation
of statutory instruments.35 The Act justifies Canadian assertion of sovereignty over the
broadcast system via its operation through radio frequencies as public property, and as a
service that is essential to national identity and cultural sovereignty.36 Several policy objectives
are still highly relevant to ongoing debates in media content regulation (e.g., to ensure
adequate levels of regional content, high-quality standards for news, diversity of views)
while others need important updating (e.g., treatment of indigenous peoples’ productions

22
23

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See discussion below Section 4.3.2 “Personalization of Media Content and Net Neutrality”.
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s. 2(1) (“program”, i.e., “sounds or visual images, or a combination [thereof] that are intended to inform, enlighten
or entertain,” with some exclusions such as content which “does not include visual images, whether or not combined with sounds, that consist
predominantly of alphanumeric text”).
Ibid., s. 2(1) “Distribution Undertaking” (referred to as “Broadcast distribution undertakings or BDUs).
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s. 2(1) “Programming Undertaking”.
Internet and mobile broadcasters do not require a licence: see discussion below in this part.
This requirement also applies to cable and direct to home distribution undertakings: (CRTC 2019b), (listing mandatary Canadian stations that must
be offered by distribution undertakings under their basic services); Broadcasting Distribution Regulations (SOR/97-555), ss. 17–19.
Including through funding to the Canada Media fund. See (CRTC 2016), (on the Policy framework for Certified Independent Production Funds).
(CRTC 2018).
See (CRTC 2019c), (providing an overview of CRTC content standards and requirements policy).
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2 (“Canadian broadcasting system” is frequently referred to in the act; the expression is not defined).
Ibid., s. 3 (1) (a).
Ibid., s. 3(1), 3(2).
Ibid., s. 3(1) (d) (iv).
See discussion below in Section 4.1.1 “The Principle of Technological Neutrality”.
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s. 3 (1) (b).
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and media content, and obligations with respect to people with disabilities).37 The Act
modulates levels of responsibility among the various broadcast players in the Canadian
ecosystem, the public broadcaster sharing the bulk of responsibility in the implementation
of the act’s policy objectives, distribution undertakings (e.g., cable companies) and private
networks being assigned others. Among broadcast players, internet audio and video
programming entities (e.g., Netflix and Apple TV) have been conspicuously absent from
this shared responsibility.
In recent decades, the CRTC has declined on a number of occasions to regulate
internet audio and video program undertakings, while, technically, such activity falls
within the definition of broadcasting under the Broadcasting Act.38 First in 1999, through
exemption order, inter alia on the basis that the internet was not viewed a significant threat
to Canadian broadcasters, and that there was sufficient Canadian content on the internet,
no regulation was required to encourage more creation and access.39 A decade later, the
CRTC declined to impose minimum content requirements for internet broadcasters, on the
request of the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN),
a copyright collective society acting on behalf of music creators, publishers and visual
artists.40 Furthermore, the CRTC did not see the need to lift the exemption order granted
in 1999 nor to adopt “specific measures for the visibility and promotion of Canadian
content in new media”.41 Following a reference by the CRTC to the Federal Court of
Appeal, the Supreme Court later confirmed that internet Service Providers (ISPs) are not
broadcasting undertakings under the Broadcasting Act when they merely provide the mode
of transmission, exempting them as such from regulation under the Act.42
Meanwhile, the number of internet video subscriptions in Canada is steadily growing
from 14.1M in 2016 to an estimated 21.9M in 2023.43 In 2018, the revenue generated from
internet video services was $4.3B, compared to $6.627B from the traditional television
sector, of which $2.6B was generated from private and public broadcaster (CBC/SRC)
traditional stations.44
Forbearance from regulating internet audio and video services has led to a two-tier
media content space in Canada.45 On the one hand, internet audio and video undertakings
do not have to comply with content requirements—such as minimum levels of Canadian
content, linguistic duality, close captioning and other accessibility requirements, quality
standards for news reporting—nor do they have to contribute to the Canadian media
fund. At the same time, all other broadcasting undertakings need, in varying degrees, to
comply with these requirements in pursuance of the policy objectives under the Broadcasting
Act. Additionally, while technically, the Act’s objectives do not include sustaining one
particular industry or business model, this two-tiered system places the burden of Canada’s

37

38
39

40

41
42

43
44
45

See Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 127–28 (recommending important changes to Broadcasting Act, s. 3 policy goals to more
adequately reflect Indigenous peoples needs and demands with respect to Indigenous media content, and also to improve accessibility of media
content for peoples with disabilities). Bill C-10, infra note47, if adopted, would amend the Broadcasting Act ss. 3 (1) (d) (iii), (o) to (s), 5(2), and add s.
9.1(i) to that effect.
New Media Broadcasting Exemption Order, infra note 39, “Summary”; Review of Broadcasting in New Media, infra note 41 at para. 27.
CRTC, “Public Notice CRTC 1999-197: Exemption Order for New Media Broadcasting Undertakings,” Orders (17 December 1999) Government of
Canada, online: https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/1999/PB99-197.htm (accessed on 3 June 2021). [New Media Broadcasting Exemption Order]; see
also Bannerman, supra note 18 at 230–33.
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 231 (citing: Society of Canadian Authors and Composers (SOCAN), “C. Paul Spurgeon, Vice-President Legal Services
and General Counsel, SOCAN to Robert A. Morin, Secretary General, CRTC, 10 July 2008,” https://services.crtc.gc.ca/Pub/ListeInterventionList/
Documents.aspx?ID=72066&en=pb2008-44&dt=c&Lang=e, accessed on 13 May 2016).
(CRTC 2009, paras. 23–24, 48), [Review of Broadcasting in New Media].
CRTC, “Reference to the Federal Court of Appeal—Applicability of the Broadcasting Act to Internet service providers”, Broadcasting Order CRTC
2009-452 (28 July 2009) Government of Canada, online https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-452.htm (accessed on 3 June 2021); Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Re), 2010 FCA 178; Reference Re: Broadcasting Act, 2012 SCC 4 at para. 5 (confirming decision by
the Federal Court of Appeal).
(CRTC 2019a), (services from 2016 to 2019 include Netflix, Prime Video, Crave, Disney, Club Illico).
Ibid.
Golick and Speer, supra note 10 at 16 (citing scholars, policy report, ministry declarations pointing toward the need to bring important changes to the
broadcasting system).
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broadcasting policy objectives on the non-internet-based undertakings, while some of the
overall broadcasting revenues are being diverted to internet-based undertakings.46
This differential treatment between internet and non-internet-based undertakings is
increasingly under pressure given that overtime, technological advances improving internet
speed of transmission, access, and sophisticated targeted online content programming,
have brought the internet and non-internet broadcasting spheres closer together. Legislative
reform seeking to address this gap is underway.47 Among others, regulatory forbearance
with respect to internet broadcasting calls into question the principle of technological
neutrality, which we explore further below.48
In sum, the Broadcasting Act and the CRTC’s main role and objectives have been to
steer the curating and commissioning of media content in accordance with stated legal
requirements and policy goals, which, in recent decades, have not applied to internet
undertakings. The regulation of the Canadian broadcasting system has given rise to
intense debate, legislative review and proposed reform. We will now examine current
media content regulatory challenges, in particular the forbearance to regulate internet
broadcasting undertakings, through the lens of sovereignty. This organizing principle
helps identify the source of the legitimacy of various subjects and actors’ powers and
interests, locally and globally.
4. The Competing Dynamics of Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a principle of international law generally associated with a state’s absolute power over its territory and its peoples, as well as mutual recognition of such powers
among states in the international order.49 Under a modern conception of sovereignty, the
power of the state stems from its peoples. Therefore, sovereign subjects in international
law are the peoples within states and no longer states alone.50 Likewise, sovereignty is
exercised and constrained by the peoples through the international and national legal
orders.51 As a corollary, international democratic standards can support the emergence of
new sovereign states, through the right to self-determination.52 As such, state sovereignty
“cannot be dissociated from the protection of the political equality and human rights of the
individuals constituting that State, and cannot per se be regarded as incompatible with the
values it is meant to help pursue,” which at times gives rise to contradictions arising from
the co-existence of individual and collective autonomy.53
Sovereignty, as the measure of permissible exercise of power, is highly politicized and
its contours are therefore contested.54 As pointed out by Besson, the concept of sovereignty,
epistemically and normatively endures and has remained not in spite of, but because of
its controversial nature.55 Several legal principles flow from the concept of sovereignty,
including to determine the territorial application and scope of laws.56 Additionally, while
there may not be a uniform definition of sovereignty, the concept implies a critical mass of

46
47

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Ibid.
Bill C-10: An Act to amend the Broadcasting Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2d Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (third reading 21 June 2021)
[Bill C-10] (adding “online undertaking” to “broadcast undertaking”, amending ss 3(1) (f) to (h) and (o) to (s) with various obligations regarding
contribution to creation and discoverability of Canadian content; as of the submission date of this article, Bill C-10 was still under review and
debate).
See discussion in Section 4.1.1 below “The Principle of Technological Neutrality”.
(Besson 2011, para. 13), (the origins of the modern conception of sovereignty goes back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which recognized state
power over their territory as well as the principle of non-intervention between states); (Troper 2012, p. 354), see also (Woods 2018, pp. 328, 360).
Besson, supra note 49 at para 143.
Ibid. at para 143.
Ibid.
Ibid. at para 133, 36 (pointing to a “two-pillar construction of the international legal order that protects democratic autonomy through sovereignty,
on the one hand, and individual autonomy through human rights, on the other”).
Troper, supra note 49 at 350–54 (on various scholarly debates around sovereignty and on how concept is used in constitutions and in legislative
instruments).
Besson, supra note 49 at para 4.
See below Section 4.1.2 “Territorial Jurisdiction Constraints and Precedents”.
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competence, power, and ultimately legitimacy to act over a range of matters.57 Sovereignty
is dynamic and in flux. As with other powers, it is exercised or waived in varying degrees,
eventually leading to greater or diminished political autonomy.
Of course, it is the de-territorialized immaterial nature of cyberspace that resists the
seamless application of this traditional conception of sovereignty—devised, after all, to
refer to bounded places. From this perspective, McLuhan may have been apt in addressing
global flow and lack of borders as the major change and challenge of digital culture. He
often applied the phrase “without walls” as a visual image to help us see the radical
openness associated with connectivity; without sense of privacy or individuality—the
hallmark of modernist identity—we are in the process of cultivating a sense of attachment
to others and groups, bounded in affiliations less by locale than by common interests.58
This move from any sense of being rooted in place and autonomous or independent could
mean, he argued, an end to nations and the practice of national politics as we know them.
It might lead to an expanded sense of identity—stepping in to cosmic consciousness—yet
if mismanaged or undermanaged, it could lead equally to dissension and division. To echo
a title work, there were possibilities for “war and peace in the global village”59 —the latter
if we had a shared or overarching commons.
Contrary to popular view, cyberspace is not a global commons, as can be said of the
atmosphere or the ocean.60 As one international relations scholar notes: “Paradoxically,
although cyberspace seems borderless, it is actually bounded by the physical infrastructures
that facilitate the transfer of data and information. Such infrastructures are mostly owned
by the private sector and are located in the sovereign territory of states. Therefore, it would
be more precise to argue that cyberspace comprises a global common infrastructure, but is
not a global commons.”61 Another international scholar, casts virtual space as not entirely
new or unknown, but resembling such spaces we have known and successfully navigated
in the form of the “telegram, the television and telecommunications.”62 Advising states to
act, and to resume models they have mobilized for other electronic communications media,
this commentator suggests that while sovereignty and state authority is “changed” it is “not
erased.”63 This argument is linked to the internet imagined as layered space, particularly
as given in Benjamin Bratton’s The Stack, with six-layers, one of which is inhabited by users.
Bratton invites us to understand digital space as structure and infrastructure—as having
materiality—as something we not only engage but enter. Even if it offers “new spaces”
that mix material with immateriality, it is potentially manageable.64 Bratton says sovereign
authority can emanate from within this new space—which again suggests that the internet
can be conceptualized as having a form into which we have already integrated.
Media content creation and dissemination act both as a fuel and threat to democratic
institutions. Likewise, the imposition of constraints through state regulation can both
nurture and hamper meaningful, diverse, and representative expression. As we saw earlier,
the extent to which national media content regulation should apply to internet broadcasting undertakings continues to be a highly contentious issue in Canada.65 Approaching
regulation through sovereignty requires understanding not only of the immaterial nature of
cyber space but also the multiple claims of many stakeholders—increasingly, the corporate
grip and network effects of powerful platform actors.66
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Besson supra note 49 at para. 77.
See, e.g., Understanding Media, supra note 7 at 176, 255.
Supra note 8.
(Liaropoulos 2016, p. 16), (citing the work of David J.Betz and Tim Stevens).
Ibid. at 16 (citing the work of Paul Cornish).
(Mainwaring 2020), at 7 (referring to the work of Mark Lemley, and of Stephen Graham).
Ibid. at 7.
(Bratton 2016, p. 52).
Supra note 38–46.
See generally Liaropoulos, supra note 60 (on the multi-stakeholderism involved in cyberspace governance).
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At the international level, scholars observe that there is an East–West divide on
the exercise of state sovereignty in cyberspace. We think of China as favoring national
control (to maximize state power), as opposed to North American strategies that favor a
wider coalition, one including business interests. As one international relations scholar
summarizes, China emphasizes “the sovereign rights of states in cyber-space” to discourage
global governance which they see as “still dominated by Western countries particularly the
United States, in terms of Internet resources, technology standards, international norms,
and ideological discourse”.67 Other scholars note the friction between competing visions
of cyber governance—a cosmopolitan view favoring a free internet (open to corporate
incursions) “that aspires to one set of rules everywhere” and, “diametrically opposed,” a
more nationalistic approach “a sovereign-difference ideal that sees the Internet operating
differently in different places according to local norms, customs, and rules”.68
The appeal of sovereignty, as an organizing principle, lies in mapping out the exercise
of state power through its peoples, both domestically and as generally recognized in
the international order. It embeds the duality and contradictions between political and
individual autonomy. We now turn to how sovereignty is claimed, exercised, or recognized
by states, transnational media platforms, and individuals with respect to media content.
4.1. National Sovereignty
This part examines the space in which Canada exercises its sovereignty on media
content (or has refrained from doing so) through the lens of technological neutrality,
territorial jurisdiction constraints and precedents, and revisits the main justifications of
media content regulation in light of various external and internal pressures, including with
respect to data or digital sovereignty. In this realm, national sovereignty refers to the exercise
of power through state regulation, and national cultural sovereignty to a main justification
for such exercise, and overall objective of Canadian regulation of media content.69 The
purpose here is not to argue how media content regulation may or should further national
cultural sovereignty. Rather, we examine the parameters within which Canada may exercise
national sovereignty in the current media space.
State attempts to regulate media content are bound to be controversial. Support
for ensuring access to quality content that informs, entertains, and exposes viewers to a
diversity of opinions and perspectives is intertwined with fears of censorship and control
to serve powerful state and other interests. The controversies around national cultural
sovereignty as a Canadian objective of media content regulation, and on how it should
be implemented are not new. There are longstanding internal political pressures, from
Indigenous peoples and the Québec francophone population, that call in question the
legitimacy of the Canadian government to make decisions about funding, programming
and content that concern their culture.70 Broader debates include whether national cultural
sovereignty should promote a strong local broadcasting industry or support local creators
and producers71 ; or whether we should let media content to market forces, or promote
identified values and objectives, Canadian creations, and content through regulation; and
the particular focus of this part, the extent to which we may regulate internet broadcasting
to the same extent as traditional forms of over-the-air broadcasting outlet.
The current media space does not alleviate the tensions around the justifications
for state regulation. Globalization, the rising power of transnational media platforms,
67
68
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(Cuihong 2018, p. 648).
Woods, supra note 49 at 367.
Supra note 33–36.
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 195, 207 (on how at the time of the entry into force of Canada’s first Broadcasting Act in 1932, associations based in
Québec were suspicious and disliked that the federal government affirm its power in Canadian broadcasting; and on how Indigenous peoples’
claims of sovereignty regarding the broadcasting spectrum are founded on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, however have not yet been
formally recognized in Canada, unlike other jurisdictions, and on how following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (2015) questions
are discussed on how broadcasting law and policy can further the objective of reconciliation).
Golick and Speer, supra note 10 at 7 (on how Canada’s broadcasting law and policy has traditionally been focusing on protecting local broadcasters
and a local market, and how it needs to shift toward supporting Canadian creators and producers on global markets).
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neoliberalist ideals engendering a priori suspicion of state regulation, and more generally
the networked society, which knows no boundaries, all clash with the idea of national
jurisdiction exercise of power.72 At the same time, this current media space is giving rise to
a growing support for some form of state regulation and intervention. In a post-truth, fake
news, networked society era, there is a recognition that while media content can be a key
engine of modern democracies, it can also be a weapon undermining their institutions and
existence.
State sovereignty referring to the flexible exercise of state power on behalf of the
people is a concept that can be helpful in allaying populist resistance to the exertion of
any state power to media content. Central to Maurice Charland’s now-classic critique of
Canadian broadcast policies as “Technological Nationalism” is the assumption that the
Canadian government has used technologies such as a national railroad and broadcast
system to “foster empire”, with the aim of building a sense of unified nationhood under
the centralizing power of the Ottawa capital—integrating the west “into the economic
and political systems which had developed in eastern Canada”.73 In recommending that
Canada reinvigorate regulatory policy frameworks already in place, we are acknowledging
Canada’s history of space binding through government mandated technological projects,
but calling for a form of rejuvenation that is less attached to the goal of consolidating state
power than it is to fostering local and independent citizen projects. Certainly, McLuhan was
a strong advocate for citizen involvement in technological developments, describing public
participation as an energizing agency positioning us “to anticipate events hopefully, rather
than to participate in them fatalistically”.74 More recently and specifically Hackett ascribes
critical value to involvement in the form of “audience resistance,” so that audiences do not
simply accept packaged content but act as participatory stakeholders and seek out and
contribute to sources whose value they determine.75 If we call on government to develop
and implement flexible policies to regulate digital content and distribution, there is new
urgency in the user-interactive digital environment to ensure public involvement.
We now turn to the principle of technological neutrality and the extent to which it
may provide a useful framework of reference to navigate through Canada’s ongoing media
content regulation dilemma including the extent to which it should regulate internet media
undertakings.
4.1.1. The Principle of Technological Neutrality
Technological neutrality is a principle according to which laws should be drafted and
interpreted independently of any form of technology, ensuring their pérennité (longevity)
and adaptability, as new forms of technology continue to emerge and evolve.76 The
principle is embedded in legislation,77 legislative reform objectives and has been applied
by the Supreme Court of Canada to the Copyright Act.78 Technological neutrality guides
72
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Hamilton and Robinson, supra note 4 at 22; Flew, supra note 21 at 75–76, (pointing to five main challenges to state regulation of media content: decline
of nation-state power, neo-liberalism, the internet as global network, global media enhancing consumer choice and removal of previous media
scarcity as justification for state regulation, and shift of regulatory influence to non-state actors, media platforms, non-governmental organizations
and various advocacy groups).
Charland, supra note 10 at 199, 202–3.
(McLuhan 1973, p. 57).
(Hackett 2019, pp. 96–97).
(Reed 2007, p. 266), (while also emphasizing the ambiguity of the concept, at 264–69); (Greenberg 2016, p. 1495); see (Craig 2016, p. 603); (Hagen
2013, p. 311), (pointing out that the principle applies unless Parliament intended otherwise). See also (Hutchinson 2015) (describing technological
neutrality as containing two dimensions when applied to copyright: non- discrimination between technologies and non-interference, requiring high
thresholds of conduct or activity before copyright liability will be attracted).
See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s. 3(1)c (describing the exclusive right to produce or reproduce a work “in any material form
whatever”); Broadcasting Act, supra note 2 (“Broadcasting: means any transmission of programs, whether or not encrypted, by radio waves
or other means of telecommunication for reception by the public [ . . . ] emphasis added); see (Trudel 2009, p. 9).
Supra note 77; Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 at paras 5–10, 48–49;
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para 43; Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 2003 Inc,
2015 SCC 57at paras 45–55, 62–63, 65–96, 139–44, 148,150–83 [SODRAC]; Robertson v Thomson Corp, 2006 SCC 43 at paras 48–49, 74–75, 86–88, 94
(referring to the concept of “media neutrality”); Keatley Surveying Ltd. v Teranet Inc., 2019 SCC 43 at paras 86–88.
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how the CRTC implements telecommunication policy objectives,79 and it has been invoked
as a guiding principle for the future of communications and media content regulation in
Canada.80
The principle of technological neutrality has been inconsistently applied by courts
and governments, giving rise to diverging outcomes.81 As such, technological neutrality
is criticized for its lack of clarity and certainty. Does technological neutrality require that
the law apply uniformly for different types of technology, regardless of the compatibility
of the outcome with the overall purpose of a statute, or does technological neutrality
require to apply the law to new technology following a purposive analysis of the statute?
For example, a strict interpretation of technological neutrality may consider a digital
reproduction of a work for archival or back up purposes as an act that a priori infringes
copyright and requires the consent of the right holder.82 A more purposive application of
technological neutrality may situate the digital reproduction as an inherent exigency of
the new technology; and, in light of the overall objective of copyright, would lead to an
opposite conclusion, i.e., that the digital reproductions should not fall within the exclusive
rights of copyright holders and should not attract additional royalties.83 In this latter
understanding, perhaps technological neutrality is a misnomer84 and technological adaptability
or technological discrimination might be a better way of achieving the intended goals of
longevity and equality that technological neutrality seeks to achieve.85
An application of technological neutrality based on the overall purpose of a statute
seems to be more aligned with its raison d’être of adaptability of legal interpretation to
counter, or at a minimum slow down, the obsolescence of statutes in light of ongoing
technological shifts.86 In this view, it calls into question the role of judges, from applying
judicial restraint with respect to laws adopted democratically, to more creative judicial
interpretation as the context and technological environment continue to evolve.87 The
principle of technological neutrality and how it should apply go to the heart of the debate
on the role of the judiciary vis à vis legislative bodies in a modern democracy. In other
words, technological neutrality has its own limits and building too much adaptability into
this principle may bring it to collapse under the weight of impracticability or vagueness or
lead to unwarranted judicial creativity.
With these preambles in mind, we now look at how a purposive application of technological neutrality may inform media content regulation dilemmas, using the example of the
CRTC forbearance to regulate internet broadcasting in recent decades, leading to a two-tier
broadcasting system in Canada.88 The definition of “broadcasting” in the Broadcasting Act
includes audio and video internet transmissions, and has been interpreted as giving jurisdiction to the CRTC to regulate such transmissions.89 The question of how technological
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Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy Objectives, SOR/2006-355, s. 1(b)(iv).
Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 116 (recommending “a redefinition of the activities and actors subject to regulation that is
technologically neutral and forward looking” with respect to the regulation of media content); (Government of Canada 2020c), (on how Bill C-10,
supra note 47, follows technologically neutral principles by applying similar regulations to similar broadcasting undertakings).
Reed, supra note 76 at 266–69 (on different understandings and applications of technological neutrality); Craig, supra note 76 at 606–15.
SODRAC, supra note 78 at paras 45–55, 62–63 (majority reasons).
Ibid. at paras 139–44, 148, 150–83 (dissenting reasons by Abella J.).
See (Craig 2013, p. 274), (citing Bert-Jaap Koops on the many facets of technological neutrality, and observing that none of these components
effectively require neutrality that would preclude any discrimination between technologies).
See Greenberg, supra note 76 at 1546–59 (making the case for embedded mechanisms allowing technological discrimination in the US Copyright Act
(and eventually other statutes) as a better way to ensure that the goals of technological neutrality of statutory longevity and doctrinal equivalence
would be achieved, while avoiding the unintended effects of the application of technological neutrality).
See Craig, supra note 76 at 612–15 (referring to an expansive application of technological neutrality in Canadian copyright law as an application of
principle of prescriptive parallelism).
See (Chapdelaine 2017, pp. 184–87).
Supra note 45.
Broadcasting Act, supra note 2, s.2(1) (definition of “broadcasting”, referring to radio waves or other means of telecommunication, (emphasis added));
CRTC New Media Broadcasting Exemption Order, supra note 39; Bill C-10, supra note 47 (ss. 1(1), 2(1) to amend “broadcasting undertaking” to
include “online undertaking: an undertaking for the transmission or retransmission of programs over the Internet for reception by the public by
means of broadcasting receiving apparatus”).
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neutrality applies arises with respect to the CRTC specifically exempting internet audio
and video undertakings by order. Arguably, such exemption order was not, at the time it
was issued, inconsistent with a purposive application of technological neutrality (although
it would have contravened a strict application of technological neutrality). The CRTC
looked at the nature of internet broadcasts, in light of the Canadian broadcasting space
at the time, together with the overall objectives of the Broadcasting Act. This was meant
to ensure that the Broadcasting Act would be applied consistently in accordance with its
overarching purpose and policy objectives, across various methods of transmission, while
taking their differences into account.
Over time, digital technology improvements progressively allowed the dissemination
of high-quality internet broadcasts bringing them closer to traditional over-the-air broadcasting.90 Sophisticated “over-the-top” (OTT) broadcasting offerings, specifically targeting
Canadian audiences, competing for subscription and at times advertising revenues, resemble in many ways on demand, discriminatory and other over-the-air broadcasting offerings.
In turn, traditional over-the-air broadcasters have increased their reach by making their
broadcasts available online, and by developing specific video-on-demand platforms. Under
a technologically neutral approach to media content regulation, whether through a purposive or strict application of this principle, one would be hard pressed to find arguments
supporting a completely differential treatment of internet broadcasts relative to traditional
over-the-air broadcasts. In fact, such interpretation is bound to engender what the principle
of technological neutrality seeks to avoid: a discriminatory and arbitrary application of the
law based on technological differences, and the obsolescence of the Broadcasting Act and of
the Canadian broadcasting system overtime. The exercise of national sovereignty through
regulation of media content needs to follow the principle of technological neutrality, while
respecting the boundaries of jurisdiction normally attributed to laws’ territorial reach.
4.1.2. Territorial Jurisdiction Constraints and Precedents
Attempts to regulate activity originating from foreign entities via the internet are often
met with resistance on the basis that this might overstep a state’s jurisdiction. State powers
and laws are generally limited to the state’s territory, in accordance with the international
law principle of state sovereignty,91 and further to presumptions of legislative intent.92
Canadian laws may confer powers of extra-territorial effect,93 provided that Parliament’s
intention to do so is unequivocal or by necessary implication.94 For instance, the Radio
Communication Act makes explicit reference to the exercise of extra-territorial power.95
Even when a law follows the general rule of territoriality, its application will often involve
multi-jurisdictional aspects giving rise to extra-territorial issues. Pursuant to the principle
of international comity, such extra-territorial effects are acceptable on a consensual and
reciprocal basis between nation states.96
The regulation of telecommunication is a good example where a law’s extra-territorial
effects may come into play. By nature, telecommunication necessarily involves multijurisdictional actors, transnational networks, and other international components. To
determine Canada’s jurisdiction over matters with extra-territorial aspects, courts have
90
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Gollick and Speer, supra note 10 at 6 (referring to estimates that by 2020 there would be more over-the-top subscribers than subscribers to traditional
broadcasters, citing statistics reported by Danielle Desjardins).
(Kindred et al. 1993, p. 325). See also Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc, 2006 SCC 52 at para 53 (on the general rule of non-extraterritoriality of laws in the
context of the enforcement of foreign judgements).
(Sullivan 2014, p. 839), (on the presumption “that legislation is not intended to apply extra-territorially to persons, things or events outside the
boundaries of the enacting jurisdiction); Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC
45 at para 55 [CAIP].
Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22&23 Geo. 5, c.4, s.3 (Parliament of a Dominion “has full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation”).
Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 at 1051. Allowance between states for some extra-territorial effect of laws flows from the principle of
international comity: Hilton v. Guyot 159 U.S. 113 (1895) at 163–64.
Supra note 15, s. 3(3) (stating the application of the Act within Canada and on board specific vessels, aircrafts, etc., with a specific connection to
Canada (as listed) and on any structure, platform, etc., attached to land in the continental shelf of Canada).
Sullivan, supra note 92 at 842; see also CAIP, supra note 92 at para 60.
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developed the “real and substantial connection test”, under which the conduct over which
Canada seeks to assert its jurisdiction must have a significant connection to Canada.97 This
test seeks to minimize national overreach and reflects the reality of “the territorial limits of
law under the international legal order.”98
In CAIP,99 the Supreme Court had to determine whether music downloaded in Canada
from another jurisdiction was subject to the Copyright Act and, in such case, whether internet
intermediaries were liable to pay royalties to SOCAN, a copyright collective society.100
The Court noted that the Copyright Act respected the general territoriality principle.101 The
Court confirmed that the Copyright Act can apply to international internet transmission if
the transmission involves a “real and substantial connection to Canada”.102 With respect to
the internet, the connecting factors include the location of the content provider, of the host
server, the intermediaries, and end users, to be weighed depending on the particular facts
of the case.103 The Court concluded that the Copyright Act could apply to transmissions
originating in Canada and originating abroad but received in Canada (although the liability
of foreign content providers was not an issue in that case).104
The real and substantial connection test when met may confer jurisdictional powers to
Canada over activities, services provided over the internet even by foreign companies.
As per CAIP, an internet broadcast entity that specifically targets a significant portion of
Canadian consumers could constitute a sufficient connecting factor to confer regulatory
powers to Canada. There are other precedents conferring jurisdictional powers to Canada
over the internet that have some extra-territorial ramifications.105
Claims that the regulation of foreign internet undertakings goes against the principle
of state sovereignty are unfounded. In that space, rhetoric condemning any regulation
impacting internet content as an affront to freedom of expression and as impeding “innovation without permission” looms large.106 There are precedents allowing flexibility
when it comes to the jurisdictional space that Canada can occupy regarding media content
regulation. The recent Communications Future Report recommends that Canada’s jurisdictional powers under the Telecommunications Act should be clarified to “establish explicit
jurisdiction over all persons and entities providing, or offering to provide, electronic communications services in Canada, even if they do not have a place of business in Canada”, and
should not be left to be decided by courts on a case by case basis.107 The same clarifications
would be in order with respect to media content regulation. Furthermore, another assertion
of Canadian sovereignty over foreign media content providers includes subjecting those
foreign entities to collect sales tax to the same extent that Canadian companies do.108
4.1.3. Justifications for National Media Content Regulation
This part revisits traditional justifications invoked for the national regulation of media
content, i.e., scarcity, pervasiveness, and national cultural sovereignty, through the lens
97
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CAIP, supra note 92 at para 60 (citing previous Supreme Court decisions elaborating and applying the principle); R v Larche, 2006 SCC 56 at para 59
(citing Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 and United States of America v. Lépine, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 286).
CAIP, supra note 92 at para 60 (citing Tolofson, supra note 94 at 1047).
Supra note 92.
Ibid. at paras 1, 6–7.
Ibid. at para 56.
Ibid. at para 60.
Ibid. at para 61.
Ibid. at paras 76–77.
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34 at para 47 (on the inevitable extraterritorial reach for injunctive relief sought against Google Inc. for
materials posted on the internet, Supreme Court upholding worldwide interlocutory injunctions against Google Inc.).
Review of Broadcasting in New Media, supra note 41 (with Concurring Opinion of Timothy Denton, then CRTC Commissioner, arguing that the
critical issue around any attempt to regulate internet broadcasting was freedom of speech as it amounted to censorship and the CRTC role was not
about protecting traditional broadcasters).
Supra note 1 at 67 (Recommendation 19).
Ibid. at 174 (making such recommendation, following the footsteps of the Province of Québec and Saskatchewan that already collect sales tax
with respect to foreign online services undertakings); (Government of Canada 2021), (Government of Canada introducing goods and services and
harmonized sales taxes as of 1 July 2021 for cross-border digital products and services including video and music streaming platform sites).
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of technological neutrality, state jurisdictional powers and in light of the current media
content ecosystem and space.
A common justification invoked to support national regulation of media content is
scarcity.109 Over-the-air broadcasting requires the careful allocation of radio frequencies, a
limited resource viewed as public good.110 Thus, in exchange for spectrum allocation, a
broadcast undertaking needs to comply with various technical and content requirements.
Digital technology improvements progressively allowed the dissemination of high-quality
internet broadcasts (OTT), independently of traditional over-the-air broadcasting.111 Even
in the realm of over-the-air broadcasting, digital broadcasts require less space than analog
broadcasts, so that more channels can co-exist on the spectrum.112 Thus, scarcity does not
provide a justification for the regulation of internet broadcasts, and more generally, the
rationale of scarcity has become less prominent with respect to digital broadcasts.
The progressive expansion of internet broadcasts also occasioned a shift away from
the physical connection of radio frequencies to a given territory—an a priori traditional
requirement for the exercise of state sovereignty—to global borderless means for the
dissemination of content. However, this is not the only reason why scarcity is an insufficient
justification for the regulation of media content. While scarcity may once have provided a
sound rationale for national regulation for some aspects of broadcasting, e.g., the quality
of equipment used to avoid interference and preserving the integrity of signals, scarcity
has never been sine qua none for the regulation of media content, e.g., minimum Canadian
content requirements, quality standards of news, ban against offensive material, and respect
for linguistic duality. One can easily conceive the national regulation for careful spectrum
allocation and respect for technical standards, with no requirement of content standards
whatsoever. Furthermore, the scarcity justification for media content regulation is bound to
one specific form of technology and in this way departs from the otherwise technologically
neutral definition of broadcasting in the Broadcasting Act. For these reasons, the justification
for parameters and quality standards of media content ought to be found elsewhere.
Another frequent justification for the national regulation of mediation content is
pervasiveness. The broadcasting market in Canada and other parts of the world, is or was
once heavily concentrated, offering viewers a limited amount of programming options
including news on which viewers heavily relied.113 In this environment, broadcasting was
viewed as pervasive and invasive to a fairly captive audience. These characteristics have
traditionally justified the regulation of broadcasting.114 Then, viewers were progressively
exposed to a broad range of TV channel options with the introduction of cable TV. Recording
technologies (VCR, PVR) added flexibility to viewing habits diminishing even more the
pervasiveness of early day, over-the-air broadcasting.
With the proliferation of OTT broadcasting, the offerings increased even more, and
the market has become highly decentralized and fragmented. 115 OTT global platforms not
subjected to Canadian broadcast regulation emerged as dominant content programming
forces, putting even greater pressure on national cultural sovereignty as a central objective
of Canada’s broadcasting policy. Viewers access their news, tv shows, movies globally, in
an environment that is very different from the early days of broadcasting. The proliferation
of internet broadcasting through global platforms (Netflix, Apple TV, Amazon Prime
109
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Flew, supra note 21 at 75; Bannerman, supra note 18 at 190–91.
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 190; Golick and Speer, supra note 10 at 7 (on how the scarcity of radio frequencies were viewed as a public asset that
justified, necessitated even media content regulation).
Gollick and Speer, supra note 10 at 6 (referring to estimates that by 2020 there would be more over-the-top subscribers than subscribers to traditional
broadcasters, citing statistics reported by Danielle Desjardins).
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 191 (explaining why spectrum scarcity, at a technical level, has become less prevalent with the introduction of digital
technologies).
Golick and Speer, supra note 10 at 9–11 (on the evolution of broadcasting in Canada from a concentrated market of a small number of broadcasters,
where access to programming was free to viewers, and revenue was derived from advertising, to a subscription model to channels with the advent
of cable tv specialized channels, to a decentralized global market with the advent of OTT internet broadcasting).
Bannerman, supra note 18 at 192–93.
Ibid.
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Video, etc.) is significantly distancing viewers from traditional broadcasters including the
Canadian ones.
While pervasiveness is no longer a defining trait of over-the-air broadcasting, it
manifests itself elsewhere through the devices with which we access media content on the
internet.116 Smart phones and other devices have progressively mutated media content
consumption habits from newspapers or confined household TV sets, to an “always on”
portable mode defying any temporal, geographical, or physical constraints. Architectures
of devices, of internet platforms, are specifically designed in a way that baits and then
retains our attention, in constant competition for advertising revenues, and accessing even
more highly lucrative personal data.117 The personal data collection on those platforms and
smart phones, the ability to track our habits, preferences, ins and out as we consume media
content, have brought the pervasiveness elsewhere, justifying new forms of regulation.
In the Canadian context, national cultural sovereignty has been at the heart of broadcasting regulation both as justification and overall policy objective.118 In theory, national
cultural sovereignty is more technologically neutral than scarcity or pervasiveness, which
flow from specific traditional over-the-air broadcasting (i.e., in method of delivery and as
fixed unidirectional real-time scheduled programming). In a borderless networked society,
is it still sound to ground media content regulation on the need to nurture and preserve
national cultural sovereignty? Can this objective be realistically achieved or is it illusory in
the current media content space?
We contend that national cultural sovereignty was, and still is, the most plausible
justification for national media content regulation, although some of the goals and dynamics
have shifted in a digital environment. The pressures that supported such justification
50 years ago for a population the size of Canada, are still present today in different
forms, both domestically and abroad. As a key subset of this objective, steering the
commissioning and the curating and discoverability of media content toward strengthening
Canadian culture and identity—in all its diversity, locally and abroad—should remain
among the essential functions and focus of media content regulation. While scarcity and
pervasiveness may have supported curating-driven regulation, as offerings continue to
multiply, curation plays another role of sorting through a sea of media content to connect
Canadian viewers to content that is relevant to them, through discoverability or other
means. Regulatory oversight of firms’ data-driven personalized discoverability practices
may also be warranted.119 Of course, the framework and parameters we apply to such
objectives will be critical, as discussed below.120 This includes adapting the exercise of
national (cultural) sovereignty over media content regulation to the exigencies of the
internet, and properly accounting for other competing sovereignties.
The exercise of national cultural sovereignty needs to assess Canada’s data sovereignty
in light of the intensification of extraction and aggregation of personal data of media content viewers.121 At the infrastructure level, does it serve Canada’s broadcasting law and
policy and the interest of Canadian viewers to have our national broadcasting corporation
CBC/SRC use YOU Tube as a default platform to disseminate its programming online?
Has CBC/SRC entered into an agreement with YouTube to ensure the interests of Canadian
viewers accessing the digital platform are protected and in line with Canada’s broadcasting
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See (Klonick 2018, p. 1661) (on the traditional justification of pervasiveness for the regulation of broadcasting in the US and about a different form
of pervasiveness on the Internet); Flew, supra note 21 at 78 (on the convergence of different media requiring new approaches to media content
regulation).
(Wu 2016) at 6 (on how attention is a commodity, the retention of which is central to several media business model and on how it impacts human
consciousness).
Supra note 33–36.
See below Section 4.3.2 “Personalization of Media Content and Net Neutrality”.
See below Section 6 “Conclusion: Mapping the Contours and Justifications of States’ Mediating Powers and Regulation of Media Content”
(reaffirming and redefining national cultural sovereignty).
See below Section 4.3.1 “Viewers’ Personal Data Collection”. For a discussion on scope and limits of data or digital sovereignty, see Woods, supra
note 49 at 360–66; (Pohle and Thiel 2020).
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law and policy?122 Furthermore, Canada’s media content policy should address which
Canadian viewers’ personal data is collected in the aggregate, used, and generally available
to internet broadcasters, concerning viewers’ programming choices, preferences, viewing
habits, etc. Such Canadian personal data in the aggregate contains a wealth of information
which could be used for purposes that undermine Canadian national (cultural) sovereignty.
Conversely, proper use of such aggregated personal data could strengthen Canada’s endeavors towards its media content policy goals, including to better support its creators
and producers. Canada’s media content policy should therefore ensure proper control and
accessibility to aggregated viewers’ data to serve such greater public interest goals.
4.2. Transnational Digital Platforms Sovereignty
Julie Cohen describes how digital platforms such as Netflix, AppleTv, and Facebook
have the characteristics of sovereign states.123 Digital platforms, as the main locus of
economic activity in the networked society, have territories and populations of users
in the billions, out numbering any of the largest states.124 Platform territories are not
physical spaces: they are rather “defined using protocols, data flows, and algorithms.
Both technically and experientially, however, they are clearly demarcated spaces with
virtual borders that platforms guard vigilantly”.125 Transnational digital platforms develop
diplomatic relations with various states and regional organizations and have states design
new roles to specifically deal with them.126 Digital platforms exercise power over users
through standard term agreements, privacy policy, algorithms, platform architectures,
codes and processes to sanction undesirable conduct.127 Similarly, attorney and political
activist Zephyr Teachout is relentless in her attack on the governmental aspirations of
mega companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple, who” dominate all aspects
of choice, controlling markets, picking winners and losers, listening in on conversations,
directing purchases”.128
Although in the past, similar comparisons have been made between state exercise of
power and other transnational corporations, the level of connectedness, network effects,
pervasiveness, and control exercised by digital platforms on large populations of users,
make the analogy of digital platform powers to state sovereignty even more compelling.
They disrupt the traditional model of state sovereignty and international order at the
domestic level of exercise of state power, by exerting dominant power in the global sphere,
and by inserting themselves between the state and their peoples, who become governed by
a complex, opaque web of non-state orders on which their livelihoods, social networks,
education, entertainment, and fitness routines increasingly depend (as intensified during
the COVID-19 pandemic times).
Examples abound about digital platforms defying states’ sovereignty and enforcement
powers, behaving more like countries at the international level than as ordinary corporate
entities subjected to the law of the jurisdiction where they conduct business.129 Closer to
home, Facebook has refused in the past to comply with demands by Canada’s Office of the
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An access to information request was submitted to CBC/SRC asking whether CBC/SRC entered into agreements with YouTube and about the
general terms of such agreements concerning the handling and access by CBC/SRC to personal data relevant to Canadians. CBC/SRC did not
disclose any specific agreement and responded that it was not aware of specific terms between CBC/SRC and YouTube/Google Inc. concerning the
handling of personal data.
(Cohen 2017, pp. 199–202).
Ibid. at 136, 200.
Ibid.
Cohen, supra note123, at 187–188. See also: (Teachout 2020, p. 111), (pointing out that “Corporate money is everywhere in politics” leading to “a new
kind of political system in which big companies directly become the primary political institution”).
Cohen, supra note 123 at 202 (“imposing their own regulatory structures on permitted conduct—e.g., sponsored search results, Facebook “likes” and
“tags,” Twitter retweets—and their own internal sanctions on disfavored conduct”).
Teachout, supra note 126 at 56.
Woods, supra note 49 at 339–51 (providing an overview of high-profile disputes opposing dominant internet companies and states).
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Privacy Commissioner,130 and Netflix has refused to comply with reporting requirements
that the CRTC introduced for internet broadcasters.131 As one commentator observes,
while in the short term, internet firms may have interest to operate under a single set of
norms at the global level, in the long run, “resisting state rules while taking advantage
of the state’s market is likely to be unsuccessful for the company” and to be harmful for
internet users more generally, inviting for more sovereignty deference by internet firms.132
More often, digital platforms exert their dominance without breaching laws. Voids,
weaknesses, and ambiguity of the law have facilitated digital platforms prodigious ascensions, changing the narrative on how human rights, local tax, labor, anti-trust, privacy,
contract and consumer protection laws should apply, and to their advantage.133 A case in
point is Canada’s decision in recent decades (through the CRTC) to largely exempt digital
platform broadcasters from regulation, leaving internet broadcasting platforms such as
Amazon Prime Video, Apple TV, Netflix off the hook to contribute to creation of Canadian
content, to comply with Canadian content minimum requirements, close captioning, or
other broadcast regulation requirements. Even when laws and their regulatory compliance
requirements are in place, the lack of enforcement powers, or of foresight from regulatory
bodies (e.g., anti-trust or privacy regulators) on how the law should apply to digital platforms leaves platforms largely free to operate on their own terms, unhindered.134 Decades
later, the dominance of internet broadcast platforms challenge the very notion of Canadian
cultural sovereignty as implemented through broadcasting law and policy.
With strong rhetoric and aspirations for an open, global internet where transnational
platforms should innovate and operate freely, we should not lose sight that while having
global presence, digital platforms such as Netflix and others, target jurisdictions individually and tailor their offerings accordingly and locally. This attenuates the global nature
of the internet argument, under which states should stay out of any interference. When
internet platforms offer programming in Canada that is distinct from programming offered
elsewhere, this needs to be taken into account in assessing the extent to which Canadian
media content regulation should apply to them. Local tailoring of offerings increases
the real and substantial connection of an internet undertaking to Canada, and with that,
Canada’s justification to exercise its jurisdiction thereto.135 Furthermore, digital media
content platforms may impair viewers’ personal (data) sovereignty in important ways,
which we explore next.
4.3. Personal (Data) Sovereignty
The assertion of power through state regulation of media content, founded upon the
preservation and flourishing of national cultural sovereignty,136 is intimately intertwined
with issues of personal sovereignty, on the premise that the state’s powers are legitimate in
so far as they are as a vessel to its peoples, and particularly so in matters so fundamental to
democracy and to personal and collective identity, as is the expression embedded in media
content.
The exercise of personal sovereignty and autonomy justifies important limitations to
state powers in media content regulation. Canadian legislative reform could (un)intendedly
subject user-generated content to regulation as a form of broadcast program. Concerns
about such potential overreach were strongly voiced in recent public debates.137 Most
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See, e.g., (Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2019), (around the Cambridge Analytica scandal, about Facebook disputing the findings of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, and refusing to implement recommendations to address deficiencies).
(Armstrong 2014), (Netflix invoking confidentiality and sensitivity of information concerns).
Woods, supra note 49 at 405.
Cohen, supra note 123 at 176.
(Khan 2017, p. 743), (generally on anti-trust laws and regulatory bodies inability to properly identify and address market dominance in the new
platform economy, resorting to Amazon.com business model example as case study).
Supra note 97–105 (on real and substantial connection test to assert jurisdiction over extra-territorial matters).
See above Section 4.1.3 “Justifications for National Media Content Regulation” (on the enduring prevalence of national cultural sovereignty as main
justification and objective of media content regulation in Canada).
See, e.g., (Geist 2021a).
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would agree that media content regulation should not per se target individuals and the
content they share via social media platforms, in compliance with Government’s obligations
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.138 Any legislation bringing internet
broadcasters under the Canadian broadcasting system would also need to ensure that
proper limitations for user-generated content are in place. Recognizing that the tension
between the exercise of state sovereignty and personal sovereignty embedded in usergenerated content needs to be adequately dealt with, this part focuses on less explored
facets of viewer-citizens’ sovereignty and autonomy.
Three areas involve issues of personal sovereignty and autonomy that are inextricably
linked to cultural and media content policy. The first one deals with the lack of control
viewers have over the collection of their personal data. The second area concerns issues of
personalization of media content and its connection to net neutrality. The third one deals
with individuals’ access to quality, reliable, and secure networks.
4.3.1. Viewers’ Personal Data Collection
While the relationship between media content regulation and issues of privacy and
personal data protection has been noted in recent legal reform and policy papers,139 this
interaction tends to be overlooked in policy and legal reform debate, relative to other issues
such as imposing Canadian content funding obligations on internet broadcasters, to level
the playing field with traditional broadcasters subjected to this obligation.
In recent decades, an entire economy has developed around the extraction of personal
data for the purpose of perfecting the predictability of viewers and other consumers’ behavior. “Data is the new oil”.140 This massive extraction goes way beyond the collection of
personal data for the purpose of service delivery and service improvement that directly
benefit viewers. Additionally, increasingly sophisticated personal data extraction is not
confined to advertisement purposes either: it is of direct benefit to any firm having an interest in purchasing or accessing probabilistic information about viewer and other consumer
behavior.141
Recently, Zuboff picked up the theme of the digital world as one marked by loss
of boundaries, suggesting that this leaves us vulnerable to prying extractions and lets
corporate marauders move at will. We are open books, paying for services and content we
never knew we wanted and vulnerable to data extraction, living in a state of “boundarylessness”.142 In her view, corporate platforms can take what they want since we are unguarded
by individual or national defenses. They offer targeted menus of media services, devised
to curtail user options and maximize corporate profits, and we navigate through and select
from these targeted offerings with little state protection. Ron Deibert, too, picks up the
language of geographical exposure to argue that we are rendered vulnerable to attack,
without fortress, gate or barrier to incursions.143 Both commentators would agree, we have
a situation in which anyone can watch us, all guards down.
The value embedded in the collection and analysis of personal data has been referred
to as “behavioral surplus”.144 Initially developed to improve the quality of targeted
advertising and online advertising revenues,145 the powerful algorithms enabling data
extraction and predictive analytics continually improve through machine learning and
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S. 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
See, e.g., Communications Future Report, supra note 1 ss. 4.3, 4.4 (on the need to address the impact of big data collection on consumers of
communication and broadcasting services and making recommendations for legal reform in that regard, such as explicit reference to privacy as a
policy objective of the Broadcasting Act, and increased cooperation between the CRTC and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner).
Coined phrase attributed to Clive Humby, UK Mathematician and architect of Tesco’s Clubcard, 2006.
Zuboff, supra note 6 at 96.
Ibid. at 289.
(Deibert 2020, p. 283).
Zuboff, supra note 6 at 8, 63–97.
Ibid. at 74–82 (describing how, in the early 2000, Google created new algorithms protected by patents, that tapped into detailed personal data
available through users’ search engine functions to develop a profitable business model based on increasing advertising revenues).
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exponential online traffic, enabling the creation of “data doubles”.146 In the realm of
television broadcasting, personal data collection across various platforms enables more
precise audience predictions and analysis.147
Under the guise of convoluted standard terms of use nobody reads but “agrees to”,
misleading and deceptive privacy terms,148 and often soft privacy laws with limited public
bodies’ enforcement powers and oversight, the collection of big data has quickly become
one of the largest forms of extraction with the lowest public regulatory oversight.149
While in Canada, there has been some recognition of personal data protection as a quasiconstitutional right,150 the regulatory regime of personal data protection under PIPEDA
(and other relevant laws) offers flexibility in the types of uses made of personal data by
firms,151 with limited public body enforcement powers.152
A substantial gap exists between viewers and other consumers’ reasonable expectation
of how their personal data is used (e.g., strictly to improve the quality of the service to
viewers’ benefit or other purposes serving supplier or third parties’ benefit) and how such
personal data is actually used by the digital platforms collecting the data and third parties.
As Frank Pasquale explains in The Black Box Society,153 the lack of transparency regarding
the handling of personal data has been a defining feature of e-commerce and the digital
economy.154 This knowledge gap illustrates the lack of control viewers have over the use of
their personal data online. There is often no opting out from personal data not being used
beyond a specific purpose, other than by not using the app or digital platform altogether.
Movements toward regaining more control over consumers’ personal data, returning
to a decentralized web,155 and regulatory responses to that effect such as the EU GDPR,156
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,157 and Canadian privacy legislative reform,158
flow directly from this growing concern. In the realm of media content, the pervasiveness
and intrusiveness that once was a primary justification of the regulation of broadcasting in
a highly concentrated market environment, has now shifted to the realm of the collection
and use of viewers’ personal data in the most intimate corners of our lives, for concealed
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(Haggerty and Ericson 2000, p. 613), (referring to “the formation and coalescence of a new type of body, a form of becoming which transcends
human corporeality and reduces flesh to pure information”).
(Murschetz and Schültz 2018, p. 8).
See, e.g., Complaint at 9, 23, 48, United States v. Facebook, No. 19-cv-2184 (D.C. 24 July 2019) [hereinafter US Complaint]; settlement order granted:
United States v. Facebook, No. 19-2184. 2020 U.S. Dist. WL 1975785 (D.C. 23 April 2020) (under which Facebook agreed to pay a fine of US $5
billions and to take various remedial actions in settlement of US Complaint, having allegedly resorted to misleading and deceptive information
regarding users’ privacy settings, e.g., “Facebook did not disclose to users that sharing their non-public posts with Friends would allow Facebook to
share those posts with third-party developers of Friends’ apps”).
(Pasquale 2015, pp. 3–4; Lillington 2019; Radin 2013, pp. 19–51), (on why we do not read standard terms of use and generally on the normative and
democratic degradation that ensue from the widespread use of “boilerplates”).
Douez v. Facebook 2017 SCC 33 at para 59; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, ss 7–8 (affording some protection without specifically referring to privacy, under the right to life, liberty and the
security of the person, and the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure).
PIPEDA, supra note19, s. 6.1; Sch.1 s. 4.3.1, s. 5.3 requires firms to obtain valid consent to collection of personal data with no obligation to state the
purpose of use, subjecting appropriateness of purpose to a reasonable expectation test. See (Piper 2000), (criticizing the permissive personal data
collection framework of PIPEDA, as it is based on a commodified view of personal data as opposed to deserving human rights protection).
(Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2020), (calling for law reform and more enforcement powers); See also (Office of Privacy Commissioner
of Canada 2021), (about how privacy Bill C-11 if passed into law, would not grant more public enforcement power and could even be a step back
regarding the protection of personal data).
Pasquale, supra note 149.
Ibid. at 3 (facilitated by: “The law, so aggressively protective of secrecy in the world of commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the privacy
of persons”); Zuboff, supra note 6 at 338–35 (listing several factors explaining how “surveillance capitalists” have been able to get away for so long
with concealing personal data handling practices from their consumers and the public; among them, consumers’ self-interest, social persuasion,
inevitabilism, ignorance, and unprecedented, i.e., sui generis environment, logic and methods that were initially impossible to comprehend).
See, e.g., (Verborgh 2019).
EU, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119 at 1 [EU
GDPR].
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§1798.100–1798.199 (2018).
BILL C-11, An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to make consequential and
related amendments to other Acts, 2d Sess, 43rd Parl (2020), (first reading 17 November 2020); (Government of Canada 2020b).
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purposes that may go beyond viewers’ immediate interests and benefits as they engage
with media content. Ensuring tighter control over the extraction of personal data related to
media content consumption is even more critical than other online mundane e-commerce
transactions. As such, media content regulation needs to pay attention not only to content,
how it is produced, how it is disseminated, but also to what happens behind the scenes
when viewers are watching or listening.
4.3.2. Personalization of Media Content and Net Neutrality
The second area whereby personal sovereignty and autonomy may be compromised
is a subset of personal data extraction. It concerns the widespread practice of algorithmic
personalization of media content. It raises issues of curation, content discoverability, traditionally associated with media content law and policy. Personalization also raises concerns
similar to the ones that preservation of net neutrality seeks to address.
The personalization of viewers’ experience is a well-established business practice of
media content providers such as Netflix, Spotify, or You Tube, or of social media platforms.
More generally, personalization is a staple of search engine tools’ efficiency, and is the
preferred seductive lexicon used by online service providers to justify the collection and
use of viewers’ personal data.159
While consumers may benefit from the convenience of content personalization, including discoverability of relevant content among an overwhelming abundance of information,
there is cause for concern when personalization seeks to influence viewers’ decisions or
behavior in ways that may work against their interests, while serving the primary interests
of the platform operator or third parties.160 As Tanya Kant observes: “if content is not
being customized and personalized by consumers themselves, then what agent(s)lie behind personalization?”161 To what extent does it compromise rather than serve consumer
autonomy?162 Our exposure to cultural, educational, entertainment content through films,
TV programming, news reporting, shapes our beliefs, understanding and connection to
the world. It touches upon profound and intimate aspects of the human experience where
viewers may be more vulnerable, impressionable, or more easily manipulated, than in
other online spheres of e-commerce.163
Hunt and Mc Kelvey posit algorithmic personalization of media content as a form of
cultural policy, i.e., the management of “cultural expression through code”.164 Personalization of media content is a form of curation, a main function of traditional broadcasting,
subject to the Broadcasting Act’s framework and policy goals.165 Yet, personalization diverges from traditional broadcasting curation in important ways. As Kant points out,
personalization of media content amounts to a form of narrowcasting.166 Traditional broadcasting offers the same programming to all viewers who actively and consciously select
therefrom. System-initiated personalization changes the discoverability of offerings in
ways not necessarily transparent to consumers, and as such may compromise consumers’
sovereignty, as not solely serving viewers’ autonomy and empowerment.167
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The collection of personalized data for online personalized ads has been widespread for several years. See Zuboff, supra note 6 at 19, 256 (on how
the term “personalization” is used by suppliers as a euphemism to justify detailed collection of consumers’ personal data to improve the prediction
of their behavior to better influence their future decision making and choices).
Ibid. at 19, 78.
(Kant 2014, p. 394).
Ibid. at 394–95.
(Elkin-Koren 2007, pp. 1136–37), (arguing that the consumption of “cultural artefacts” may require more attention than the consumption of mundane
commodities: “Cultural artefacts are not simply useful commodities. While they often have an entertainment value that could be quantified, they
also possess a communicative value and a symbolic significance. They engage our minds in a more direct and intimate way than do mundane
commodities and, therefore, expose consumers to a higher risk of deeper and more intrusive restrictions of freedom. This particular vulnerability of
information consumers is often overlooked.”).
(Hunt and McKelvey 2019, p. 318).
Supra note 33–37.
Kant, supra note 161 at 394–95 (taking a critical stance on the view that commercial personalization as a form of narrowcasting enhances consumers’
autonomy).
Ibid. at 396.
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Algorithmic personalization of media content deserves greater attention when directly
running against core democratic values and the main objectives pursued by media content
regulation. For instance, Canadian broadcasting regulation seeks to protect viewers’ potential vulnerabilities while at the same time promoting respect of identified shared values,
and exposure to a variety of perspectives, and by setting minimum content quality standards, such as ensuring news’ accuracy.168 Various effects and concerns of personalization
of media content have been widely commented upon. Among those, the phenomenon
of “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” and the proliferation of fake news, have been
analysed in detail by Napoli.169 On that front, platform operators are rarely mere neutral
conduits and their interests may be misaligned with viewers’ personal or the greater public
interest of maintaining a level of news’ accuracy.170 The displacement of the traditional
curation role of broadcasters fulfilling certain journalistic standards places increasingly
heavy burdens on viewers in sorting out the true from the false.171 Proposals for a publicregarding approach to promote meaningful exposure to media content diversity have been
made by Helberger and others, while acknowledging the complexities and pitfalls of state
intervention in that regard.172
Algorithmic personalization of media content raises issues similar to what the law
and policy objective of net neutrality seeks to address.173 Net neutrality is the principle
by which broadband carriers should not discriminate the traffic that goes through their
networks, as a mean to preserve the public nature of the internet and maximize the socioeconomic benefits to be derived therefrom.174 In Canada, the application of the principle
derives from the Telecommunications Act.175 The CRTC manages exceptions to net neutrality
through the framework of Internet Traffic Management Practices (“ITMP”) and Differential
Pricing Practices (“DPP”).176 The merits of net neutrality are controversial and debated
and its application is in a state of flux in many parts of the world including the US.177
internet service providers lead the pack of opponents to net neutrality, invoking the need for
flexibility to manage their network traffic efficiently.178 Proponents supporting regulatory
oversight of net neutrality invoke various arguments such as the transparency of internet
backbone infrastructure, maintaining a competitive environment, promoting innovation,
and preserving free expression and political freedoms.179
Technically, net neutrality applies at the level of internet service providers traffic
management (speed, quality of transmission, site access blocking, etc.) and not at the level
of the content travelling through this infrastructure. The division between internet content
and infrastructure delivery has been (and still is) subject to distinct regulatory frameworks
regimes with different liability regimes applying to internet service providers and content

168
169

170
171
172

173
174
175
176

177
178
179

Supra note 33–37.
(Napoli 2018, pp. 61–62), (how personalization of newsfeeds and media content reinforces existing views and beliefs with less exposure to counter
facts or truths; the author suggests six main reasons why digital technology favours the circulation of misinformation within the broader purpose of
unpacking assumptions embedded in the counter speech doctrine from a US perspective).
See, e.g., Hunt and Mc Kelvey, supra note 164 at 314 (about platform operators’ incentives to increase shareholder value through algorithms and
architectures that retain viewers’ attention to generate higher advertising revenues); Wu, supra note117.
Hamilton and Robinson, supra note 4 at 25 (referring to the work of Napoli, supra note 169).
See, e.g., (Helberger 2015, pp. 1329–30), (on the role public service media can play to ensure diversity of media content through meaningful exposure
beyond broad supply, and on the use of “diversity by design” algorithms that could counter the effects of personalization and “filter bubbles”, while
also warning against dangers of use of state powers and intervention in that regard).
(Easley et al. 2018).
(Wu 2003, p. 171).
Supra note 14, ss. 27(2), 36.
“Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-657” (21 October 2009), online: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission https:
//crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-657.htm#VII (accessed on 3 June 2021); “Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-104” (20 April 2017), online:
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-104.htm (accessed on 3 June 2021).
(Ovide 2021).
Ibid.
Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 108 (summarizing key justifications of net neutrality based on a multi-jurisdiction overview of the
principle).
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providers.180 Subjecting content providers offering services in a given jurisdiction to
comply with its criminal, language, intellectual property, or consumer protection laws does
not contravene network neutrality. Although it raises unique issues of monitoring and
legal enforcement, the internet is no law-free zone and the law of a relevant jurisdiction
will apply a priori and indiscriminately to all. The carrier vs. content provider divide is
less clear when content providers handling large volumes of media content (e.g., Spotify,
Netflix) dictate the architecture, i.e., order of appearance, discoverability, search results,
recommendations, related ads, or may favor affiliated content over other.181 In such cases,
content providers discriminate amongst users and do not apply data neutrality. This
discrimination is reminiscent of what net neutrality seeks to prevent at the backbone
infrastructure level of the internet.182 As a form of media content curation which has
traditionally been the realm of broadcasting regulation, algorithmic personalization by
firms deserves attention from a cultural media content law and policy perspective.
In Canada’s ongoing debate about whether it should regulate some aspects of internet
broadcasting to bring it more on par with traditional over-the-air broadcasters, some
commentators opine that such regulations would weaken the principle of net neutrality.183
Following this logic, this means that in the name of a free internet, internet broadcasters and
other content providers would remain free of the scrutiny of non-neutral and discriminatory
data curating practices which in principle raise issues akin to the non-discrimination
principles that net neutrality seeks to preserve. Additionally, on the same basis, any
attempt to bring more transparency to such practices through content regulation would
go against what? Net neutrality? Such argument brings to bear the weakness of opposing
almost any form of state regulation for going against a free internet. Au contraire, regulatory
oversight may well be necessary, precisely to make the relevant media content operations
more open to scrutiny, transparent and accountable to the public.184
4.3.3. Access to Affordable Communication Networks
Citizens’ autonomy, their ability to work, study, get access to news, entertainment,
games, to connect to their world, locally and globally, requires access to quality, reliable,
and secure networks. In the networked society, internet access has quickly become a basic
utility, just as water, gas, or electricity. Discrepancies in internet access create important
barriers that may give rise to opportunity gaps and socio-economic disparities between
regions. On that basis, state investment and regulatory oversight of internet access at the
infrastructure level are required to reduce those inequalities. Recent policy recommendations and reports on the future of communications make recommendations in that regard,
and that Telecommunications Act policy objectives should include security and reliability
of telecommunications networks for the benefit of all Canadians.185 In recent years, both
Federal and Provincial levels of governments have announced massive investments in
network infrastructure to address the digital divide.186 The exercise of personal autonomy
and sovereignty is intimately tied to the state ensuring access to strong network infrastructure. Any media content regulation cannot lose sight of the pre-requisite of reliable secure
networks for peoples’ ability to access such media content in the first place, and become
full participants in the networked society, locally and globally.
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e.g., Copyright Act, supra note 77, s. 2.4(1) (b) (states the common carrier exception under which providing the means of communication transmission
of copyright works does not on its own attract copyright liability).
Easley, Guo and Krämer, supra note 173 at 265 (arguing that when favoring affiliated content is harmful and the gatekeeper has incentives to do so,
then data-neutrality regulation may be warranted); Hunt and McKelvey, supra note 164 at 314.
Easley, Guo and Krämer, supra note 173 (arguing that net neutrality relating to gatekeepers at the infrastructure level is part of a larger issue of data
neutrality when gatekeepers operate at the digital platform level).
(Geist 2020), (arguing that recommendations to promote Canadian content are inconsistent with the core principles of net neutrality in Canada).
(Mittlestadt 2016), (generally proposing algorithm auditing for providers of content personalization systems for the purpose of maintaining the
transparency of political discourse).
See, e.g., (McNally 2017); Communications Future Report, supra note 1 at 70–76, 105 (Recommendation 45).
See, e.g., (CRTC 2021; Government of Ontario 2020; Government of Canada 2019).
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To sum up, it is hard to conceive of any law and policy overseeing the creation, curation
and dissemination of media content made available to its citizens, without considering
various external influences that may undermine such endeavors at the individual and
community levels. While media content and personal data protection may have been
relatively distant fields of regulation in the past, the networked society environment has
brought the objectives pursued by each sphere closer together.187 Setting the parameters of
how the personal data of Canadian viewers is collected and used by internet broadcasters
ties to the objectives of national cultural sovereignty. Such parameters should address any
use of personal data that undermines viewers autonomy as well as the democratic and
human rights values that withstand Canada’s media content law and policy.
5. Mediating Sovereignties in the Networked Society: Insights from Media Theorists
and Other Scholars
In the ongoing debate on the future of media content regulation in Canada, the state
emerges as a mediating force between competing powers, and as gatekeeper to its peoples’
individual interests and collective aspirations, across competing technologies, physical
and virtual territories, domestically and globally. Before mapping out the contours of
such state’s mediating powers, and their underlying legal and normative justifications, we
look at the insights provided by media theorists and other scholars that may inform this
trajectory.
McLuhan often invoked “control tower” imagery, calling artists, scientists, and scholars from “the ivory tower to the control tower of society”.188 Artists (those tuned into
their sense and, in exemplary cases, trained to understand some of the physical properties
of media) are like traffic controllers for being able to see patterns and provide order to
those of us caught in the fray on the ground. Rather than rest his hope in a world calibrated by computers and algorithms—albeit, initiated by the minds and hands of human
programmers—he was imagining more human intervention and interface, a world where
computers work for and with us, rather than one we pre-program and then walk away.
McLuhan was well aware that talk of a programmed environment was bound to raise
alarms, yet he explored it as hopeful and necessary.189 He did not imagine the created
environment as one-way system, devised by a powerful cadre, deployed by computers,
and let lose to control a populace. Instead, he imagined an interactive environment, so
that intelligent users would influence programs, or use itself would lead adjust the system,
leaving room for a sort of third-space citizen hack.
Whereas our current situation encourages us to think about media distribution and
control as largely an economic and political matter—with the large transnational media
platforms acting as sovereigns with limited transparency or accountability to the public,
McLuhan saw programming as prioritizing the establishment of social wellness. The forms
of control he envisioned had at least three levers: on the level of personal sovereignty,
individuals need to be more aware of the effects of media and exercise greater agency
in self-regulation; on the level of governmentality or systemic organization, an informed
leadership needs to make creative and humane decisions meant to support social goals
and sustain life; and on the level of the regulatory framework itself, such a document
and/or set of practices needs to be subject to revision and interactive correction, so that
user feedback shapes policies and directions.
It is befitting to hearken back to McLuhan in considering our current questions about
regulating communications media. Indeed, with more media forms and concentrations,
our current questions have evolved toward clearer lines of tension—between states and
corporate giants; between citizens who want a free internet and governments intent on
protectionist measures. Additionally, whereas McLuhan tended to frame the problem as
187
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one information overload—too much innovation, connection, and information—we tend
to see the problem in terms of economics and governance: whose cultural and financial
interests are being served and whose overlooked or compromised? Yet, we would contend
the differences are more a matter of emphasis than content, and our situation now in
fact connects to and extends from the one emerging in his day. More than responding as
individuals, we need a systemic response. This response affects a global world but needs
to be sensitive to regional or localized trends. The response needs to be citizen informed
rather than imposed by any group who, not neutral, inevitably serve parochial interests.
Recognizing the links between then and now also suggests that we may not need upheaval
and radical change in our approach to control—it may help to observe what we have done,
what worked, and how to make strategic revisions.
If we turn to more recent communication and internet theorists, they also advocate for
more control, involving a combination of citizens and government. Zuboff ends The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism by calling on all of us to take notice of how technology has changed
our actions and expectations, throwing a yoke around our necks that inhibits free choice
or action. She says we need to individually awaken and to collectively demand an end to
thralldom by pronouncing “No more”.190 If Zuboff is dire in her forecast about the wages
of big tech moving in on our lives, others are equally bleak. Emphasizing aesthetics and
culture, British author and scholar James Bridle warns of the social dissolution and planetary
degradation that accompany digital life.191 Yet, despite deep concerns, both theorists believe
it is in our human reach to regain control by recognizing the dangers and asserting human
values. Zuboff concludes her critique by calling for “collective effort” to break the cycle.192
Similarly, Bridle also urges humans to take corrective action: “Our understanding of those
systems and their ramifications, and of the conscious choices we make in their design, in the
here and now comma, remain entirely within our capabilities”.193
Amongst many media theorists and other scholars, there is growing recognition that
left to unfold without rules or structure—unfurled by private corporations who have
playbooks designed to advantage their position—proliferating communication technology
threatens the safety of both planet and people. Apart from cancelling citizen privacy
and freedom and driving global economies, there are also accompanying concerns that
unbounded production of technological devices, structures, and infrastructure requires
Earth resources and produces irreversible pollutants. There is, in short, urgent and multiple
need for policy improvement and protections.194
McLuhan noted all of these pressure points intensifying with increased networking
and technological acceleration—power aggregating around manipulative corporate suppliers, citizen loss of privacy and freedom, and increasing artifice coupled with environmental
degradation—yet his underlying concern was not so much with these observable external
changes as with transformations within the human psyche and character. Media change
us, he warned. We learn to do less and want more of what they offer. Sometimes he
referred to numbing and narcosis. Other times to being drowned in a whirlpool of ever
new gadgetry. His concern was that technology was extending or externalizing some senses
and amplifying others, in the process altering our ability to perceive and know. Media,
he contended, are neither good nor bad in themselves but “morally neutral”195 —they
take on such characteristics in the uses to which we put them. For this reason too they
require strategic management aimed at creating a life-fostering environment or outcomes.
He encouraged recognition of the learning possibilities and life supports attendant on a
networked environment, imagining us as on the “threshold” of “a liberating and exhila-

190
191
192
193
194
195

Zuboff, supra note 6 at 525.
(Bridle 2018, p. 252).
Zuboff, supra note 6 at 525.
Briddle, supra note 191 at 252.
See for recent treatment: (Crawford 2021).
(Rogaway 1969), at 22 [McLuhan, Playboy].

Laws 2021, 10, 66

26 of 31

rating world.”196 We hear similar enthusiasm in Laura Denardis’ recent examination of
imbedded internet—, when she notes that governance wrangles and dangers aside, we
now use technology for medical leaps and discovery and correction, so that we need to
understand it part of us, “a human space.”197
As these reference points show, the call for regulation and protection has history amongst
communications scholars—we can hear it, from McLuhan forward, in various urgings for
humanity to establish safety nets to protect culture and citizens. There have been accompanying exhortations to discourage digital creep—to prohibit not only the stealing of recognizable
architectures like state and national boundaries, but also hooding the dimensions and content
of human dreams and actions. New media still comes with promise—not false enchantments to amuse us to death (as Postman famously feared),198 but real excitements, such as
the possibilities of travelling safely through space or curing bodies wracked by pain. To
optimize these advantages—and to do so in equitable, sustainable and life-enhancing ways—
requires the exercise of some meaningful form of public interest controls. Global governance
scholar Denardis—noting that the internet has enhanced our lives with “groundbreaking
transformation”—captures the pressing policy work ahead: “Ultimately, shaping human
rights and security in the cyber-physical world is now an enormous collective-action problem
in which all are vulnerable and all are responsible”.199
Without providing map and plan, McLuhan urged that moving forward in our humanmade technologized networked environment required human intervention/leadership
and control. We needed, he said, a “civil defense against media fallout”.200 Of course, in
his view, it was not rapid-fire media developments alone that posed the threat, but the
corporate forces driving development, and teaching us to become ever more dependent
and captive. We continue in the situation he described: walls down and digital services
streaming across borders, looking for accountability and transparency to the public, and
equity amongst key constituents of the media content space.
6. Conclusions: Mapping the Contours and Justifications of States’ Mediating Powers
and Regulation of Media Content
As media theorists and other scholars inform us, the stakes and power struggles
around the regulation of media content between states, private undertakings, artists,
creators, consumers, and various community groups are not new to the networked society
and cyberspace. What has changed is the pervasiveness of personal data extraction as we
consume media content, which calls for Canadian citizens’ protection at the individual
level, as well as national attention at the big data aggregate level.
What justified broadcasting regulation fifty years ago—i.e., Canada’s cultural sovereignty
in a global market, through the commissioning of Canadian content, steering the curation
of content in a way that maintains news standards of accuracy, reflects Canadian values,
identity, and diversity, regionally and nationally, indigenous peoples, bilingualism, and
increasingly indigenous languages, marginalized, racialized, LGBTQ and other groups—
remains highly relevant today. Yet, any state interference in that space, both domestically
and externally, remains highly contested, from the low interventionist Canadian media
funding contribution to more invasive content standard requirements.
Another angle for assessing justification rests on acknowledging how the aims and
purposes of broadcast regulation have changed over time in Canada. It is understandable
that Canadian Marshall McLuhan came to coin what is now widely seen as a truism that
“the medium is the message ” if we consider his exposure to a broadcast and communication industry that Charland aptly critiques as apparatus designed to promote the ideal
of unity and connectivity rather than to enable circulation of extant cultural content—so
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that the cross-continental train forged physical linkage while radio enabled national conversation and cultural exchange. In some ways, a similar situation holds today, for it
is not so much particular content that government may want to control (not expressly
limiting American-based and biased news and programming, nor censoring programming
developed by groups or individuals), but to apply Canada’s broadcasting policy to new
technological environments when feasible and desirable (e.g., funding obligations for creation of Canadian content). This is a crucial difference. While the project of technological
nationalism relied on technological apparatus itself to forge a unified sense of Canadian
identity and nationhood, if Canada seeks a renewed broadcast policy framework, it will
be one that aims at flexibility rather than consolidation and one that abandons unity and
homogeneity to encourage individual, local, and heterogeneous voices and values.
It is precisely for its highly contested nature, not in spite of it, that the state needs
to continue provide oversight of media content to varying degrees. The parameters of
intervention will be informed by freedom of expression as a fundamental protected human
right under Canada’s Constitution, and its acceptable limits. Legislation and resulting
ongoing policy implementation on the tools to be deployed (e.g., for the commissioning of
Canadian content, or impacting content curating or its discoverability) will be transparent,
follow democratic processes, consultation, participation by various groups, addressing
collective interests (e.g., Canadian creators or Canadian identity, Indigenous peoples,
Québécois/French Canadians, other minority groups) or individual rights (e.g., human
rights or consumer privacy protection). The state intervention will be modulated. It may
be prescriptive (e.g., requiring close captioning for media content specifically targeting
Canadian viewers), commitment oriented (e.g., contribution to Canadian media fund)
or standard based (ensuring undertakings’ algorithmic content discovery practices are
transparent or meet minimum requirements related to Canadian content). It will ensure
that proper infrastructure is in place, providing affordable access to reliable and secure
networks to all citizens. In a nutshell, maintaining state sovereignty through regulatory
oversight of media content provides a public forum for debate, denouncing flaws, gaps,
or inconsistencies, promoting transparency and accountability over matters that are fundamental to Canadians and to a functional democracy. Positing the importance of state
oversight is by no means a glorification of current or future regulation of media content or
of democratic processes in general. There is no shortage of imperfections or gaps and will
likely continue to be.201 What we emphasize here is the public platform and open process
that state regulatory oversight provides. Additionally, this is critical for matters as sensitive
and fragile as a country’s cultural and media content policy and for its peoples’ privacy,
autonomy, and flourishing.
The absence of regulatory oversight of media content that specifically targets Canadians, on the basis that it is provided through the internet, amounts to outsourcing an
increasingly significant portion of Canada’s cultural policy to private undertakings either
within, but mostly outside Canada. There is no transparency, or accountability to the
public, other than to the private undertakings’ shareholders and their bottom line, for
matters such as the commissioning, curating and discoverability of media content. It is a
significant divestiture of Canada’s sovereign power as vessel to its peoples, abandoning the
required checks and balances mechanisms that citizens should expect of a well-functioning
democracy, such as state powers that protect individual and collective interests when its
peoples are less amenable of doing so on their own. From a legal perspective, not regulating
any internet media content creates an arbitrary distinction between different technological
means of broadcasting that is not justified from a technological neutrality perspective,
and that will progressively bring our media content regulations into obsolescence. Such
regulatory restraint finds little support in Canada’s territorial jurisdiction principles, which
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does not bar Canada from regulating certain forms of internet activity that have real and
substantial connection to it.
The exercise of state sovereignty needs to be made in cooperation with international
initiatives (e.g., the development of standards) while being bounded by its intrinsic limits
and the exigencies of global cyberspace. Several law and policy goals cannot be implemented without such international guidelines. For instance, as much as Canada may
endorse net neutrality as a policy goal, its reach will be limited absent a greater commitment and endorsement on the international stage. As Woods notes, a key global governance
challenge is finding ways for states to exercise their sovereign powers in ways that are compatible with cyberspace.202 For Woods, this means two things: “accommodating sensible
sovereign control over the internet and, relatedly, embracing a global internet governance
ideal that reflects sovereign differences. We should not give states reason to assert control
by brute force—taking physical control over the network architecture in ways that produce
negative externalities. Instead, we should allow sovereigns to enforce their laws on their
soil wherever doing so does not interfere unreasonably with other sovereigns’ regulation
of the internet.”203 As such, “we must reject the fantasy that the Internet can or should be
governed by the same rules everywhere.”204 This is true for media content regulation, and
for many other spheres of regulation whereby the establishment of international minimum
standards has traditionally allowed flexibility and respect for regional differences.
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